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GOING FOR GOLD BETWEEN A ROCK
AND A HARD PLACE:
WHY THE UPCOMING Rio OLYMPICS
COULD BE THE FINAL BLOW TO
BRAZIL'S STRUGGLING ECONOMY
Kenneth B. Haesly, II
I. INTRODUCTIONT HE opportunity to host an athletic "mega-event," such as the
World Cup or the Olympics, can be an enticing call for countries
and officials all over the world; but, like the siren songs of classic
Greek mythology, alluring promises of potential economic development
and increased tourism or foreign investment can be dangerous. Brazil is
the most recent example of a country seduced by both the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) and the F6d6ration Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA), the governing bodies of the Olympics and the soccer
World Cup.' Promises of infrastructure investment to modernize
blighted areas and plans to increase national prosperity are looking more
like rocks and cliffs threatening to destabilize the largest economy in
Latin America. The upcoming Rio Olympics could be the coup de grace
to a nation that has been battling one crisis after the next in the form of
disease, recession, crime, and a corruption scandal that has led to a wide-
spread investigation and ensnared numerous high-ranking politicians. In
other words, Brazil is heading for a major crash.
The upcoming Summer Olympic Games, held in Rio de Janeiro, are
likely to serve a knockout blow to a once promising economy whose dol-
lar-denominated gross domestic product (GDP) grew as much as 7.6 per-
cent in 2010.2 This will in turn have negative spillover effects in the
surrounding region of Latin America, where regional GDP is expected to
contract by 0.5 percent in 2016, marking the first time that Latin America
has registered two consecutive years of negative growth since 1982 and
1. About FIFA, FIFA.com, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/index.htmi (last visited
June 14, 2016); The International Olympic Committee, OLYMP1Ic.ona, https://www
.olympic.org/ioc (last visited June 14, 2016).
2. Simon Romero, Insider's Account of How Graft Fed Brazil's Political Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (April 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/world/americas/insiders-
account-of-how-graft-fed-brazils-political-crisis.htmi.
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1983.3 Amid turbulent global commodity prices, slowdown in China, and
a widespread corruption scandal involving numerous high ranking offi-
cials and politicians, Brazil's GDP is expected to contract as much as 3.8
percent in 2016. Combined with projected contractions in Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela, this contraction represents over fifty per-
cent of Latin America's total gross domestic product.4
The question that one should be asking as the 2016 Rio Olympic
Games approach, and the question this article shall address, is whether
Brazil can weather a perfect storm that threatens to send Latin America
into economic free fall. Two factors indicate that it cannot: (1) the "hang-
over" economic effect that historically follows the hosts of mega-events
such as the Olympics and the World Cup, and (2) wanton fiscal misman-
agement by Brazil's political elite, as evidenced by the corruption scandal
that resulted in only the second Presidential impeachment proceeding
since democracy was reestablished in Brazil in the 1980s.5
II. AN OLYMPIC-SIZED HANGOVER
International "mega-events," such as the World Cup (hosted by Brazil
in 2014) and the Olympics, have the potential to discourage growth in
countries that do not properly allocate finances and significant financial
investments in construction (e.g., building stadiums) create waste and ec-
onomic problems for the people of the communities in which they are
erected.6 Two prominent examples of such an economic hangover are
Athens, which fell into debt after hosting the 2004 Olympics, and Cape
Town, whose stadiums largely remain empty after hosting the World Cup
in 2010.7 In 2009, when Brazil was awarded the Summer Olympics, it
might have been easy to look past these cautionary tales; the economy
had been growing, the middle class was expanding, and the time seemed
right for the country to host Latin America's first ever summer games.8
The flitbol-crazed country, just coming off the elation of being awarded
the 2014 FIFA World Cup, embarked on an infrastructure spending spree
3. Ricardo Aceves, Economic Snapshot for Latin America, Focus ECONOMICS (May
18, 2016), available at: http://www.focus-economics.com/regions/latin-america.
4. Id.
5. Andrew Jacobs & Simon Romero, Brazil's Senate Votes to Begin Impeachment
Trial of Dilma Rousseff, N.Y. TIMES (May 12 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
05/13/world/americas/dilma-rousseff-brazil-impeachment.html?_r=0.
6. Just say no, Ti-E ECONOMIST (April 28, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
books-and-arts/21645114-hosting-olympics-and-world-cup-bad-citys-health-just-
say-no.
7. Juliet Macur, The Dazzle and the Desolation of Stadiums in World Cup Host Cities,
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/sports/worldcup/
world-cup-2014-residents-wonder-how-new-stadiums-wiI-benefit-region-after-cup
.html.
8. Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Amid Recession, Brazil Struggles with the Huge Costs of the
Olympics', NPR (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/01/14/
4 63 030768/amid-recession-brazil-struggles-with-the-huge-costs-of-the-olympics.
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that was projected to top twenty-five billion dollars.9 The common the-
ory is that big sporting events are good for growth.' 0 The reality is not so
evident. Revenue generated by television rights, ticket sales, licensing,
and sponsorships are increasingly being re-appropriated to governing
bodies such as the IOC and FIFA." Though these organizations claim to
contribute to the costs of staging the contests, such "operating" costs are
a small portion of the price; the vast majority of costs are accumulated by
construction and transportation and borne entirely by the host country.1 2
A. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS WORTI THEIR WEIGHT IN GOLD
The brunt of construction spending in mega-event host countries is
often realized in what are increasingly becoming more world class and
opulent new stadiums. Such is the case in Brazil, where 300 million dol-
lars was spent on Arena Amazonia, whose brilliant structure was dis-
played on millions of television sets across the globe during the World
Cup in 2014.13 Moreover, 450 million dollars was spent on Arena das
Dunas, in Natal, Brazil.1 4 Construction of four of the twelve stadiums
built for the World Cup, including the one in Natal, cost almost two bil-
lion dollars, most of which was public money.15 Nearly eleven billion dol-
lars has been allocated for construction of venues and infrastructure
needed for the Olympics, including twenty corporate developments
meant to revitalize the downtown Porto Maravilha area of Rio - a so-
called "legacy" project of the Games intended to have lasting economic
effect (interesting to note, the Porto Maravilha project is the largest cor-
porate development in any major emerging nation, and includes divisive
US presidential candidate Donald Trump as a consultant). 16
Such lavish spending is hard to justify, even if the projects could pro-
vide continuing benefits after the events end, which they very often do
not. South Africa, which hosted the World Cup in 2010 and spent close to
thirty billion rand largely on upgrading and building stadiums across the
country, is a perfect example; the majority of stadiums there now stand
empty and operate at an annual loss - Durban's Moses Mabhida Stadium
reportedly lost 34.6 million rand in 2013 and the Cape Town Stadium
loses roughly forty million rand each year.' 7 More drastically, the nearly
nine billion Euro cost of hosting the 2004 Summer Olympics pushed
9. Binyamin Appelbaum, Does Hosting the Olympics Actually Pay Off?, N.Y. Timiws
MAG. (August 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/magazine/does-host-
ing-the-olympics-actually-pay-off.htmi.
10. Id.
11. Jacobs & Romero, supra note 5.
12. Id.
13. Garcia-Navarro, supra note 8.
14. Just say no, supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. Caroline Stauffer, Exclusive: More Olympic projects under investigation for corrup-
tion - prosecutor, Riu-rieas (April 19, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
olympics-rio-corruption-exclusive-idUSKCNOXG2GR.
17. Lisa Steyn, Was World Cup 2010 worth it?, MAIL & GUARDIAN (June 12, 2015),
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-1 1 -was-world-cup-2010-worth-it.
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Greece under fiscal monitoring by the European Union the following
year, after the 2004 Greek deficit totaled 6.1 percent of GDP - more than
double the Eurozone limit.' 8 Greece's subsequent collapse has been well
documented.' 9
Brazil now currently faces the unenviable position of ending up at best
like South Africa, or, at worst, Greece. The former is almost a given, but
resembling the latter is a strong possibility. Arena das Dunas, in Natal
(price tag: 450 million dollars) will not regularly hold tens of thousands of
fans; the city of fewer than one million people does not even have a top
level soccer team and the lower level teams attract only several thousand
fans on their biggest game days. 20 The same is true for several others of
the twelve stadiums in total: neither Manaus nor Cuibaba nor Brasilia
have soccer teams that can consistently fill the new stadiums.2 1 Part of
the blame for this reckless spending is on the IOC and FIFA governing
committees - even though there is no formal requirement that venues in
host cities be new, cities with ambitious plans for custom-built facilities
are consistently selected for mega events. 22
III. MASS CORRUPTION
If Olympic and World Cup construction contracts on their face were
not unsettling enough, even more concerning is the shadowy business and
political games that manifest them. Five Brazilian construction firms are
building the majority of the 39 billion reais (10.8 billion USD) worth of
venues and infrastructure needed for the Rio Olympic Games.23 All five
are linked to investigations of price-fixing and kickbacks through Pe-
trobras, the state-run oil company. 24 Odebrecht, one of the largest engi-
neering firms in Brazil, has been accused of collusion and overcharging
for contracts with Petrobras, using the excess money as bribes funneled to
high-ranking politicians.25 Embattled President Dilma Rousseff is one of
many public officials to be implicated in the Petrobras scandal, though
she is one of the few politicians not facing accusations of personal enrich-
ment. 26 One-third of deputies in the lower house of Congress have been
charged or are being investigated for corruption, including Delcidio do
Amaral, a powerful leader in the Senate, and Eduardo Cunha, the
18. Nick Malkoutzis, How the 2004 Olympics Triggered Greece's Decline, BLOOMBERC,
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-02/how-the-2004-
olympics-triggered-greeces-decline.
19. See id.
20. Just say no, supra note 6.
21. Id.
22. Jacobs & Romero, supra note 5.
23. Stauffer, supra note 15.
24. Id.
25. Silvio Cascione & Brad Brooks, Update I - Brazil judge suspends Odebrecht law-
suit, in sign of plea deal, REuEri3s (June 2, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/
brazil-corruption-idUSL1N18U2GA.
26. Andrew Jacobs, Brazil Impeachment Debate Hinges on a Thorny Legal Question,
N.Y. TIMEs (April 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/world/americas/
dilma-rousseff-impeachment-brazil.html.
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Speaker of the lower house of Congress who orchestrated the impeach-
ment vote against Rousseff.2 7 Even the man standing in for Ms. Rousseff
during the impeachment proceedings, Vice President Michael Temer, has
been convicted and ordered to pay fines for violating campaign-financing
regulations. 28
A. PETROBRAS & ODEBRECHT
Formed in 1953 and now one of Latin America's largest companies,
Petrobras is the centerpiece of Brazil's economy, but a corruption scandal
involving billions of dollars in kickbacks being funneled into campaign
coffers of political parties has caused widespread anger and distrust
among the population. 29 A two-year investigation into the company,
which was launched the same year Brazil hosted the World Cup (2014),
has uncovered an extensive corruption network, resulted in the jailing of
top business executives, and led to the investigation of as many as fifty
serving politicians.3 0
The engineering firm Odebrecht, which is Latin America's biggest
builder, and who has participated in projects for both the World Cup and
the Olympics, has been the center of the investigation; in 2015, federal
police raided a stadium in Recife used for the 2014 World Cup and also
searched the office and homes of Odebrecht executives. 3 1 In 2016,
Odebrecht's former CEO, Marcelo Bahia Odebrecht, was convicted of
corruption and money laundering and sentenced to nineteen years in
prison.32 Pending lawsuits against several other executives at the com-
pany have been suspended, signaling potential plea bargain deals with
prosecutors. 33
The economic fallout in response to the corruption graft has occurred
both locally and within surrounding Latin American regions. Petrobras,
which employs nearly eighty thousand people-many of whom are in
Brazil-has lost 82.8 percent of its value since 2011, and has over 130
27. Andrew Jacobs & Vinod Sreeharsha, Vote to Impeach Rousseff Prompted Cheers,
But Won't End Turmoil in Brazil, N.Y. TiMIrs (April 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/04/1.9/world/americas/vote-to-impeach-rousseff-prompted-cheers-but-
wont-end-turmoil-in-brazil.html; see also Simon Romero, Insider's Account of
How Graft Fed Brazil's Political Crisis, N.Y. TimEs (April 3, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/world/americas/insiders-account-of-how-graft-fed-brazils-
political-crisis.html; see also Simon Romero, Brazilian Lawmaker Behind Rousseff
Impeachment is Told to Step Down, N.Y. TimIis (May 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes
.com/2016/05/06/world/americas/cunha-rousseff-brazil-impeachment.html.
28. Simon Romero, Brazilian Lawmaker Behind Rousseff Impeachment is Told to Step
Down, N.Y. TIM! s (May 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/worldlamer-
icas/cunha-rousseff-brazil-impeachment.html.
29. Romero, supra, note. 2.
30. Bruce Douglas, Petrobras investigation: Portuguese police arrest former executive,
TI-IEs GUARDIAN (March 21, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/
21/petrobras-scandal-portuguese-police-arrest-former-executive.
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billion dollars in debt.34 As investigations into the oil company scandal
continue, large numbers of Brazilians are poised to lose jobs and con-
tracts. At least 30,000 people in the oil and gas services and construction
sectors, which had Petrobras contracts, have lost their jobs, and the com-
pany has stated that an additional 12,000 workers will be laid off over the
next four years.3 5 The investigation into Odebrecht has also spilled into
Argentina, which began an investigation into whether Odebrecht's local
unit paid bribes to government officials. 36 Federal court findings in Bra-
zil have also revealed that Peruvian President Ollanta Humala may have
received three million dollars in bribes through Odebrecht contracts. 37
Additionally, Ecuador has opened audits of Odebrecht contracts in the
country, and Colombia's vice president has suggested the company could
be banned from public bids in Colombia for decades.3 8
All told, the fallout from the investigation is likely to impact the
greater Latin American economy, especially in the areas of energy and
transportation mega-projects.
B. POLITICS
The impeachment charges against Rousseff are not directly linked to
the Petrobras scandal (though she did serve as chairwoman of the com-
pany from 2003-2010), but instead stem from allegations that her Leftist
Worker's Party administration borrowed nearly eleven billion dollars
from state-owned banks to fund social programs and election campaigns
between 2010 and 2014, and then used budgetary tricks to conceal a
growing deficit.3 9 This practice of pedaling fiscal obligations into the fu-
ture, or pedaladas fiscais, is illegal in Brazil. 4 0 Rousseff has referred to
the impeachment proceedings against her as a coup, which is a loaded
term in Latin America, but even more so for Rousseff who was impris-
oned and tortured for her role as a Marxist guerilla during Brazil's mili-
tary dictatorship of the 1970s. 4 1
Ousting Rousseff may be a first step in holding corrupt politicians ac-
countable, but it is unlikely to end the economic turmoil in Brazil. In the
weeks after Rousseff's suspension and replacement by Vice President
Temer, the economy appears as stuck as ever: GDP is still predicted to
34. Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil's Latest Economic Data Not Much Better Two Weeks




36. Nicolas Misculin, Argentina Probes Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht's local




39. Jacobs, supra note 24.
40. Id.
41. Helena de Moura, Dilma Rousseff From fugitive guerilla to Brazil's new president,
CNN (Nov. 1, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/10/31/
brazil.winner.profile/.
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decline by 3.8 percent and inflation is expected to get worse, with predic-
tions by the Central Bank now suggesting a 7.06 percent increase rather
than 7.04 percent (prior to impeachment, the rate was at 6.9 percent).42
Brazil's stock market blue chips are down as well; Itau, one of Brazil's
largest banks, has a share price that is down 53 percent in five years, and
Vale, a mineral exporter, is down 86.9 percent. 4 3
Moving to impeach the President just months before the 2016 Olympic
Games begin may have been the popular move, but not necessarily the
savvy one. The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party of Rousseff's suc-
cessor, Michael Temer, is a member of the same party that has created a
financial crisis in the oil-rich state of Rio de Janeiro during their time in
leadership. 4 4 Like many of the financial woes in Brazil, the current crisis
is linked directly to the Petrobras scandal. 45 Deep-sea oil discoveries pre-
viously launched Brazil onto the global stage, primarily by exporting oil
to satisfy China's demand for commodities. 4 6 During the oil boom, legis-
lation was enacted giving state and local governments access to royalties
from the deep-sea oilfields off Rio's coast. 4 7 Rio's shares of those royal-
ties have been reduced drastically, from 3.5 billion dollars in 2014 to
about one billion dollars this year. 4 8 The economic decline and failure of
leadership concern this summer's games as well: court testimony against
Sergio Cabral, the former Governor of the party who helped bring the
Olympics to Rio, alleges that the powerful politician demanded millions
in bribes to do So.49
To stave off a complete meltdown, Brazil's new leadership will have to
implement unpopular economic reforms such as tax increases, spending
cuts, and possible austerity measures. Spending cuts and tax increases are
never popular, especially in Brazil, where social welfare programs such as
Bolsa Familia help millions of people throughout the country.5 0 Local
elections looming in October make it unlikely the new government will
impose austerity measures. Further, some spending cuts and tax in-
creases will likely need constitutional changes to enact, although Temer
42. Rapoza, supra note 31.
43. Id.
44. Simon Romero, Entrusted to Save Brazil: The Party That Ruined Rio, N.Y. TIMES






46. Simon Romero, After Living Brazil's Dream, Family Confronts Microcephaly and
Economic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (March 9,2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/09/
world/americas/after-living-brazils-dream-family-confronts-microcephaly-and-eco-
nomic-crisis.html.
47. Romero, supra note 41.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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has suggested amending the Constitution so that the government is al-
lowed to spend less on health care and education.51 Temer's biggest hur-
dle will likely be Brazil's convoluted and often truculent Congress, which
is made up of over two dozen different political parties and will likely
stymy economic reforms proposed by the Vice President or members of
his party. 52 In the meantime, many more Brazilians will suffer, primarily
the millions of working class who are already slipping into poverty during
the recession. 53 Whatever the result of the impeachment proceedings
against Rousseff, one thing is clear: Brazil needs to stabilize if it is to
return to economic strength and greater prominence on the world stage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though Brazil experienced a rare stretch of stability in the last two
decades, the current perfect storm threatens to severely impact this once
promising nation. Brazil faces several significant dilemmas: ousting their
first female president, only to replace her with a political party that the
public despises just as much, if not more; low commodity prices and a
very slowly recovering oil market, which the Brazilian economy largely
depends on; a political scandal on a scale rarely before seen, even in Bra-
zil, which has had notorious corruption issues throughout its history; 54
and a virus that the World Health Organization has declared 'a public
health emergency.'5 5 In August, Brazilians will confront a peculiar real-
ity-watching the dazzling production of the Summer Olympics while
also being able to tune in to their president's impeachment proceedings.
Unfortunately, the Rio Olympic Games are more likely to hurt, rather
than help, the struggling Brazilian economy, which will have secondary
effects on the other economies of Latin America. This is a direct result of
both the negative carry-over effect that often follows nations who are
poorly equipped to handle such mega events, and the presence of a politi-
cal scandal involving top-ranking politicians and one of the largest com-
panies (and employers) in the nation. Such concerns figure to hurt the
Brazilian economy, and could have wide-ranging repercussions elsewhere
in Latin America.
This is occurring in the midst of drastic economic challenges in Brazil,
where slumping global commodity prices have increased unemployment
to nearly ten percent (from almost seven percent one year ago), inflation
is rising, and a once-promising economy is expected to contract by as
51. Alex Cuadros, Dilma Rousseff and the Chronic Dysfunction of Brazil's Politics,
THE NEw YORKER (May 17, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/
dilma-rousseff-and-the-chronic-dysfunction-of-brazils-politics.
52. Jacobs & Sreeharsha, supra note 25.
53. Romero, supra note 43.
54. Donna Bowater, Brazil's continuing corruption problem, BBC (Sep. 16, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34255590.
55. Michael Pearson, Zika virus sparks 'public health emergency', CNN (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/01/health/zika-virus-public-health-emergency/.
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much as 3.8 percent for the second year in a row.56 To make matters even
worse, the outbreak of the Zika virus has not been limited to the north-
east region of Brazil but has spread to Rio de Janeiro as well, spurring
activists and academics to call for the Olympic games to be canceled,
postponed, or moved.57 The effects of Zika can cause pediatric micro-
cephaly and brain damage, and Rio de Janeiro has the highest suspected
cases of any state in Brazil, according to the country's Ministry of
Health.5 8 If that were not enough, a security crisis currently threatens the
"pacified" favelas, or poor shantytown neighborhoods that are scattered
throughout the city; murder and robbery are both up by double digits,
and the state security budget has been cut by a third.5 9
The road to redemption may not be easy for Brazil. The interim gov-
ernment has already been the host of an array of problems, including the
resignation of the new 'transparency minister,' after an audio recording
was released that Temer's Brazilian Democratic Movement Party pur-
sued Rousseff's impeachment in order to thwart the Petrobras investiga-
tion. 60 Temer has received further criticism for naming exclusively white
men to his new Cabinet - a subtle yet potentially troubling move in a
country where more than half of the population describe themselves as
black or mixed race.61 Even more concerning are the policy goals Temer
has suggested could be in the works - to raise money in Rio, state leaders
of the Democratic Movement Party have approved taxes of nearly twenty
percent on offshore oil production in Rio's waters. 62 At a time of low oil
prices, such measures could potentially bankrupt Rio's oil industry.6 3
Amid all the scandal and frustration, one thing in Brazil remains clear:
the Olympic show will go on. Perhaps it is this resilience to maintaining
the country's image that could keep Brazil afloat in the future. For the
sake of all of Latin America, the world should be cheering for them.
56. Jacobs & Sreeharsha, supra note 25.
57. Amir Attaran, Off the Podium: Why Public Health Concerns for Global Spread of
Zika Virus Means that Rio de Janeiro's 2016 Olympic Games Must Not Proceed,
HARVARD Puniic HEAL.THll RIvvilw (2016), available at: http://harvardpublicheal-
threview.org/off-the-podium-why-rios-201 6-olympic-games-must-not-proceed/
(last visited June 1, 2016).
58. Id.
59. Lulu Garcia-Navarro, As Olympics Near, Violence Grips Rio's 'Pacified' Favelas,
NPR (May 31, 2016, 5:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/ 3 1/
480149606/as-olympics-near-violence-grips-rios-pacified-favelas.
60. Simon Romero, Pall hangs over Brazil's presidential palace as Rousseff prepares




62. Romero, supra note 41.
63. Id.
1192016]
120 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 22
